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ADMIRALITY JURISDICTION IN AIR LAW
CARL ZOLLMANN*
B EFORE Congress passed the Air Commerce Act in 1926 a long
drawn out debate took place on the floor of the American Bar
Association and in the columns of many law reviews. There were those
who were dissatisfied with all existing constitutional provisions and
therefore advocated the adoption of an amendment to the federal con-
stitution conferring the necessary power on Congress. Another group
contended that the treaty making power of the federal government
should be dragged in by the hair and made to do yeoman service,
A third group argued that the interstate commerce clause should
be the cornerstone of the building despite the obvious fact that this
would leave intrastate flying to state action, thus complicating regula-
tion. To avoid this objection a fourth group fought vigorously for the
admiralty clause of the constitution as the basis of the assumption of
power by Congress.
The proponents of the admiralty theory advanced many cogent
analogies. Airships engage in aerial navigation, take off from airports
in charge of pilots and are required to carry red and green lights on
their wings just as ships carry such lights on their sides. The regula-
tions as to registration and nationality of aircraft, the requirements as
to their log books, their flag and the rules of the road which they
must follow bear a striking resemblance to the rules applicable to ships.
However this theory was not successful. Congress chose to base its
action on the Interstate Commerce Clause and thus ended the debate.
However this action did not remove admiralty completely from air
law. While ordinary airplanes were assimilated to automobiles rather
than to ships there remained the seaplanes and the amphibians to be
considered. These (particularly the seaplanes) spend their inactive life
on water and are like autimobiles only when they take to the air. While
they are on the water they are not merely analogous to ships, but are
ships, though they may not be very seaworthy and may be unable to
ride out a gale. Fortunately their status was judicially determined by a
great jurist-judge whose death the nation has but recently mourned.
The claimant before the court had been employed to care for a sea-
*A paper read by Professor Zollmann at the Aeronautical Law Symposium
of the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut in
New York City on Nov. 18, 1938 and included in a report of that symposium
published by Aeronautical Digest Publishing Corp., New York.
*'The reasoning was somewhat like this. The United States should conclude
treaties with foreign nations concerning air navigation and then pass laws to
enforce the treaties and by this indirect means should assume jurisdiction over
the entire subject matter.
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plane moored in navigable waters at Gravesend Bay, Brooklyn. The
plane began to drag its anchor and the claimant waded out to turn it
about and was injured by the propeller. If he was struck by a vessel
the jurisdiction of admiralty was clear and excluded the jurisdiction
of the New York Industrial Commission.2 This was the question de-
cided by Justice Cardozo in Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Cor-
poration.2 The opinion, in the best Cardozo manner, is substantially as
follows:
The latest of man's devices for locomotion has invaded the navi-
gable waters, the most ancient of his highways. Riding at anchor is a
new craft which would have mystified the Lord High Admiral in the
days when he was competing for jurisdiction with Coke and the courts
of common law. The craft, though new, is subject, while afloat, to the
tribunals of the sea. Vessels in navigable waters are within the juris-
diction of admiralty. Any structure used, or capable of being used, for
transportation upon water, is a vessel. The word has been construed
liberally. It includes a canal boat drawn by horses, a bathhouse on
floats, a raft, a scow, a dredge, a temporarily sunken drillboat-any-
thing upon water where movement is predominant rather than fixity or
permanence. A seaplane, while afloat on water capable of navigation
is subject to the admiralty because location and function stamp it as a
means of water transportation. To the extent that it is a seaplane it is
a vessel, for the medium through which it travel is the water. If
incapable of flight it breaks its moorings and causes damages or injury
there is a remedy against the offending res. If while moving on the
water it becomes disabled and is rescued it is subject to a lien for
salvage. Admiralty has jurisdiction though the structure is seaplane and
airplane combined. Although the jurisdiction is excluded while it is
acting as an airplane there is no reason for such exclusion when the
mischief is traceable to its functions as a seaplane, secondary though
they may be. Collision does not cease to be collision and a peril of
the sea because the structure is amphibious. The chance of peril is not
remote. Seaplanes abandoning the air have for days moved upon the
water. They must always move for some time on water before ascend-
ing into the air. Jurisdiction does not vary as the distance is shorter or
longer. A plane therefor is a vessel and within the jurisdiction of the
admiralty when it is in the fulfillment of its functions as a traveller
through water and has put aside its functions and capacities as a travel-
ler through the air.
This decision of Justice Cardozo, of course, is confined to seaplanes
and to amphibians while the latter are using the water rather than the
2 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Steward, 253 U.S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438, 64 L.ed. 834
(1920).232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371, 18 A.L.R. 1324 (1921).
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land for their take-off, their landing place, or their abode while at
rest. The court therefor refers with approval to a federal decision
rendered in 1914 holding that an ordinary landplane which had fallen
into a bay of Puget Sound was not subject to the admiralty jurisdiction
for the purpose of salvage.4 This decision, though rendered only by a
District Judge, has received support by the passage of the Air Com-
merce Act and may therefor be accepted, as it was by Cardozo, as
stating the law.
It does not follow of course that a seaplane while on the water
must necessarily lose its character as a flying machine. In a Missouri
case a traveller on a seaplane flying from Miami, Florida, to the
Bahama Islands was insured, but the policy excluded injuries sustained
"while in or on any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation,
or in falling therefrom or therewith." The seaplane while in plain view
of its destination was forced to descend on a rough sea and shortly
after a successful descent was overturned by a wave and the insured
perished. The court held that the plane remained a mechanical device
for aerial navigation after it was forced down on the water and that
hence there could be no recovery under the policy. The interval during
which the craft was supported by the water instead of by the air was
as much a part of the flying trip as any other. Though admiralty may
disregard the air function of the craft on facts bringing it within its
jurisdiction, courts of law may properly regard it as an air vehicle
when being used as such though afloat on water.5 The admiralty juris-
diction therefore is not under all states of fact exclusive of common
law jurisdiction though the craft is on the water at the time.
The decision of Justice Cardozo was in part based on various de-
partmental rulings treating seaplane as vessels for the purpose of the
Tariff Law or of registration. Similar rulings have followed the deci-
sion. Compasses for seaplanes have therefor been held to be entitled
to free entry as compasses for vessels.6 The New Jersey Board of
Commerce and Navigation has decided that seaplanes are vessels for
the purpose of registration.7 The Attorney General of Wisconsin has
defined a seaplane as "a boat propelled by means of a motor attached
to propellers moving in the air," and has held that its owner has the
right to use the inland navigable lakes of the state as a landing place.8
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that sea-
planes are not vessels subject to maritime liens during their repair in
4 The Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
5 Wenddorff v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S.W. (2d) 99
(1927).
830 T.D. 232.
7 1930 U.S. Av. Rep. 193.
81930 U.S. Av. Rep. 288, 289.
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a hangar.9 Seaplanes have been held by the Attorney General of Cali-
fornia not to be "vessels" within a constitutional provision exempting
vessels from taxationao
Two foreign decisions are entitled to notice. A seaplane set out
from Stettin, Germany for the island of Bornholm off the Swedish
coast. It broke a propeller and came down on the water near its desti-
nation. A passing ship took it in tow without transferring its passen-
gers. Before land could be reached the sea became rough and capsized
the plane. A number of passengers died. The "Seeamt" (admiralty
court) of Stettin investigated the disaster and made findings and rec-
ommendations for regulations to prevent a similar disaster in the
future. It investigated its own jurisdiction in the matter and decided
that a seaplane on the water is covered by the statutory word "Kauf-
fahrteishiff" (merchant vessel). Hence it held that a seaplane as soon
as it lands on water, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, is a ship
unless it is already a wreck when it reaches the water.31
A flight in a seaplane attempted by George P. Hutchinson in Sep-
tember 1932 from New York to Europe in company with his wife,
his two daughters and a crew of four ended in a forced descent off
Cape Dan, Greenland after the plane had managed to send out an
S. 0. S. which was picked up by the Lord Talbot, a fishing vessel.
When the Lord Talbot reached the location of the descent an all night
search finally disclosed that the plane had been able to make its way to
a rocky island, devoid of bird life, vegetation or shelter and sur-
rounded by an ice pack where the passengers and crew inevitably but
for the help rendered must have perished. A cinematograph camera
and equipment worth 3,000 pounds sterling had been on board the
plane for the purpose of taking pictures and obtaining sound records
as a commercial enterprise for gain. This was on the island when the
rescuers arrived. A claim of 300 pounds sterling was made for salv-
ing this apparatus. The Sheriff's Court of Aberdeen, Scotland reluc-
tantly sustained the contention that no salvage service were rendered
for the reason that the property saved from destruction was not part
of a ship's cargo, the seaplane not being considered as a ship. The
court stressed the fact that the primary function of a seaplane is travel
through the air, and held that the fact that its construction permits it
to float on the sea and even navigate a short distance is immaterial.
The language of the Merchant's Shipping Act defining a vessel as any
ship or boat "used in navigation" was stressed and it was held that the
9 United States v. Northwest Air Service Inc., 80 F. (2d) 804 (C.C.A. 9th,
1935), reversing 6 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Wash. 1934).
101937 U.S. Av. Rep. 141.
I Archly fuer Luftrecht 54, 2 J. Air. L. 588, 590.
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seaplane was not used in navigation within the meaning of these
terms."
One more New York case must be mentioned to complete this
paper. New York in 1913, before seaplanes were in practical operation,
had provided that any person who operates a boat, vessel or other float-
ing structure on certain inland lakes propelled by a gasoline engine
must run the exhaust through a muffler on pain of being guilty of a
misdemeanor. A pilot operated a seaplane over Lake George without
such a muffler. He proved that it is impossible to construct a muffler
for an airplane because the great heat of the exhaust would destroy it.
The lower court very properly held that a seaplane while it might be
covered by the words of the statute was not within its meaning and
that hence the pilot was not guilty of a violation of the statute. This
decision on some unfathomable form of undisclosed reasoning was
reversed in a memorandum decision by the Appellate Division on the
authority of the decision of Justice Cardozo above discussed?-4 Since
its effect would be to throttle air navigation over the wonderful lake
system of the state, the New York legislature in 1929 amended the
statute by providing that "hydroaeroplanes shall not be deemed boats
or floating structures within the meaning of this section."'I5
The attempt made by the Commissioners on Uniform Legislation
in drafting the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics to delimit the
respective jurisdictions of admiralty and common law in relation to
seaplanes deserves a passing notice since this act is in force in about
one third of the states. In defining the terms used by the act it is pro-
vided that "a hydroplane, while at rest on water and while being
operated on or immediately above water, shall be governed by the
rules respecting water navigation; while being operated through the
air otherwise than immediately above water, it shall be treated as an
aircraft." Of course state legislatures have no power to define ad-
miralty jurisdiction and hence this provision is largely in the nature of
a gesture. It probably has no more force than has any other resolu-
tion by the legislature. It however states the proposition as well as can
be done and therefor may have some influence on the courts. The deci-
sion of Justice Cardozo, which we have discussed probably forms the
basis of this provision.
1 Watson v. R. C. Victor Co. Inc., 50 LI.L.R. 77 (1934), 1935 U.S. Av. Rep. 147.
= People ex rel Cushing v. Smith, 119 Misc. 294, 196 N.Y. Supp. 241 (1922).
1x 119 Misc. 294, 196 N.Y. Supp. 241 (1922); 206 App. Div. 726, 199 N.Y. Supp.
942 (1923).
1 Chapter 187, Laws of New York (1929).
